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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
~-~0000000---

RONALD Do ELLIS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

v.
SOCIAL SERVICES DEPARTMENT OF
THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF
LATTER-DAY SAINTS; LDS SOCIAL
SERVICES, et al~,

Case No. 16881

Defendants-Respondents.
---0000000---

NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff, Ronald D. Ellis, commenced a habeas corpus
action in the District Court in and for Salt Lake County by
filing a Verified Complaint, January 4, 1980, alleging that he
was the natural father of a male child born out of wedlock in
Salt Lake County, Utah, on or about December 17, 1979, (actual
birthdate was December 15, 1979) seeking a determination that the
liberty of the baby was "illegally restrained" and that he, the
putative father, be awarded custody, which complaint was later
amendede

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Following a hearing before the Honorable Bryant H.
Croft, the Amended Complaint was dismissed with prejudice January
21, 1980 on the motion of defendant L.D.S. Social Services.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Plaintiff-Appellant seeks to have this Court
reverse the District Court's Dismissal and remand the matter with
instructions to determine Mr. Ellis's fitness to have

cu~tody

of

the child.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Respondents agree with the statement in Appellant's
brief that, for the purposes of this appeal, the allegations of
the verified Complaint must be considered true.

Appellant's

statement of facts, however, contains several gratuitous
additions to the verified Complaint among which are the
following: "neither (natural parent) has lived within Utah at any
time material to this action": "the (natural mother) has since
(the termination of the engagement) consistently refused Mr.
Ellis's proposals of marriage": "immediately prior to her
delivery, (the natural mother) left California and came to Utah";
"through a bishop of the L.D.S. Church in California, Mr. Ellis
learned of (the natural mother's) whereabouts and the birth of
his son": "during the week of his son's birth, Mr. Ellis and his
California attorney contacted L.D.S. Social Services and informed
them both of his paternity and of his desire to support and have
custody of his son"; "L.D.S. Social Services

failed to

advise him (the natural father) of any steps which would have to
be undertaken to protect his parental rights".
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According to the verified Complaint the California
attorney's contact with the L.D.S. Social Services occurred "on
or about December 21, 1979", a date subsequent to the
relinquishment of the baby to the child placement agency, which
relinquishment occurred December 19, 1979 (R.23).

Appellant's

attempt in the Statement of Facts to negate any contact of the
natural mother with the State of Utah goes beyond the language of
the Verified Amended Complaint.
As will be observed from the Stipulation Regarding Stay
of Adoption and Expedited Appeal, the L.D.S. Social Services has
not consented in writing to the adoption of the infant, although
it has been placed in the home of prospective adoptive parents.

No Petition for Adoption has been filed by the prospective
adoptive parents and none will be filed pending the Appeal.

ARGUMENT
The Appellant in the District Court failed to plead or
demonstrate timely compliance with Title 78-30-4(3) Utah Code
Annotated 1953 as amended and particularly (b) thereof which
provides
"The notice (of claim of paternity) may be
registered prior to the birth of the child
but must be registered prior to the date the
illegitimate child is relinquis~ed or pl~ced
with an agency licensed to provide adoption
services or prior to the filing of a petition
by a person with whom the mother has placed
the child for adoption. The notice shall be
signed by the registrant and shall include
his name and address, the name and last known
address of the mother, and either the birth
date of the child or the probable month and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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year of the expected birth of the child. The
Bureau of Vital Statistics shall maintain a
confidential registry for this purpose."
The Affidavit and Release to the adoption agency was executed by
the natural mother December 19, 1979, and Mr. Ellis failed to
file his claim of paternity until January 2, 1980.
I

I. THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAS NOT
BEEN DENIED DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL
PROTECTION OF LAW GUARANTEED TO HIM
UNDER THE UTAH AND UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTIONS.
Respondents do not dispute the contention made in
Appellant's brief that the putative father has an interest in
retaining custody of his children which is "cognizable and
substantial" under the holding of Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645, 92

s.

Ct. 1208, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551 {1972).

That case involved

the custody of Peter Stanley's two minor illegitimate children
after the death of their mother.

Despite the fact that Stanley

had lived intermittently with his children and their mother for
eighteen {18) years and had supported them during that time, he
~as

not considered a "parent" under Illinois law.

The relevant

statute defined "parent" as the mother or father of a legitimate
child but only the mother of an illegitimate child.

"Parents"

were entitled to a hearing on the question of fitness before
losing custody of their children, but because he had never
married the mother, Stanley did not qualify for such a hearing.
Under Illinois' practice, the only relevant question was whether
he was the father of legitimate children.

The answer was clearly

no, and so the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that he was not
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entitled to a hearing in which to establish his fitness.

His

childred were adjudged wards of the courtc
Stanley appealed to the United States Supreme Court
which reversed the State Court decision ruling that Illinois'
"method of presumption" would not be allowed to stand "in the
light of the fact that Illinois allows married fathers--whether
divorced, widowed or separated--and mothers--even if unwed-- the
benefit of the presumption that they are fit to raise their
childrene"

Clearly, the Stanley decision holds that a man who

has lived with and supported his illegitimate children is
entitled to a hearing on the question of his fitness before he
can be denied custodyc

Justice White refers to Stanley's

interest as "that of a man in the children he has sired
and raised", 405 UeS. at 651 (emphasis added). Shortly after the
Stanley decision, the Supreme Court indicated that its ruling was
not limited to cases in which the State intervened to deprive a
putative father of custody.

A second Illinois case,

Vanderlaan v. Vanderlaan, 9 Ill. App. 3d 260, 292 N. E. 2d 14 5,
vacated 405 U.S. 1051 (1972) was remanded involving a custody
dispute between parents of two illegitimate children.

In

addition, the court applied its ruling in Stanley to adoption
cases in Lewis v. Lutheran Social Services, 47 Wis. 2d 420, 178
N.W. 2d 56, vacated sub. nom. Rothstein v. Lutheran Social
Services, 405

u.s.

1051 (1972).

That case involved a Wisconsin

father who sought to overturn the adoption of his child after it
had been granted on the sole consent of the unwed mother.

The

Court directed reconsideration of the case "in light of
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/

Stanley • • • and with due consideration for the completion of
the adoption proceedings and the fact that the child has
apparently lived with the adoptive family for the intervening
period of time".
In the Lewis case the unwed father, seeking custody,
filed for a declaration of his parental rights and duties.

The

initial court action took place in December, 1968, five months
after the baby's birth and four months after the mother had
relinquished the child for adoption.

~he

father challenged the

Wisconsin statute that required only the mother's consent to
adoption without notice to the father.

The father lost but two

years later the United States Supreme Court remanded.

The

Wisconsin court then issued a new post-Stanley decision, (Lewis
v. Lutheran Social Services of Wisconsin, 59 Wis. 2d 1, 207 N.W.
2d 826 (1973]) in which it held as a matter of law that both
unwed parents were entitled to notice of the proposed adoption
and both were required to consent, unless their parental rights
had been legally terminated.

The case was sent back to the trial

court for factual findings regarding the parents' consents and
rights.

Finally in April, 1975, three years after Stanley and

nearly seven years after

~he

child's birth, the fourth and

apparently final decision was rendered, Lewis v. Lutheran Social
Services of Wisconsin, 68 Wis. 2d 36, 227 N.W. 2d 643 (1975).
The Wisconsin trial court concluded and the Supreme Court
affirmed that the father had forfeited his rights by abandoning
the child before it was born (emphasis added).
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The statute which Illinois enacted following Stanley
has been criticized as "an overreaction to Stanley . . . . entirely
understandable in view of the reaction of the United States
Supreme Court to the legal status of the unwed father in
Illinois", see Barron, "Notice to the Unwed Father and
Termination of Rights: Implementing Stanley v. Illinois," 9 Fam.
L. Q. 527. The reaction, or overreaction, took the form of,
first, including all unwed fathers in the statutory definition of
"parent" Ill. Ann .. Stat. Ch. 4, Sec. 9.1-lE (Smith-Hurd, 197S)
and second, requiring notice of a proposed adoption and either
consent or termination of rights by all such fathers, Ill. Ann.
Stat .. Ch .. 4, Sec. 9.l-8(a), 9 .. 1012(a) (Smith-Hurd, 1975).

These

statutes have been criticized as creating unmanageable practical
difficulties in that the state assumes the burden of locating the
putative father.

In seeking to make its adoptions invulnerable

to attack on due process grounds it requires that notice be given
to all fathers, known and unknown, concerned and indifferent
(emphasis added).
Some states have attempted to comply with Stanley's
guidelines by shifting the initial burdens of identification and
location onto the father or mother.

For instance, Colorado

requires notice only to fathers who have supported the child or
acknowledged paternity in writing, or whose name appears on the
birth certificate, Colo. Rev. Stat. Title 19, Sec. 1-103(21)
(1973}.
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The cases thus far noted, Stanley, Vanderlaan,· and
Lewis, all involved fathers who had initiated legal proceedings.
The difficulties of notice to those fathers who do not come
forward were dealt with in Stanley only in a footnote in which
the court noted, "if unwed fathers in the main do not care about
the disposition of their children, they will not appear to demand
hearings", 405 U.S. at 657 n. 11$

It could be argued, therefore,

that under Stanley the father has the initial burden of appearing
so that he may be kept informed.

The difficulty is the problem

of fathers who are unaware either of their paternity, actual or
impending, or of the adoption hearing.

States that do not

actively reach out to notify such fathers have decided that the
biological link alone, clearly much weaker than the on-going
relationship with his children of the father in Stanley, does not
create such an "essential" interest that state protection is
guaranteed, particularly where other interests such as speedy
placement of a child in a permanent home may be affected.
Wisconsin's revised statute which went into effect
June, 1974,· defined "parent" as "a person adjudged in a court
proceeding to be a natural father", (Wis. Stat. Ann. Sec. 48.02
(Il), W. Supp. 1976).

Wiscons"in allows "any person(s) claiming.

to be the father" who has not acquired legal status as a "parent"
to file a declaration of his interest in his child at any time
prior to termination of his rights.

The declaration is filed

with the Department of Health and Social Services, and must
contain the mother's name and address, and the date or expected
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date of the child's birth, as well as a statement that the
claimant has "reason to believe that he may be the father of the
child".

The Department sends a copy of the declaration to the

mother who may file a response.

The mother's failure to respond

is not, however, an admission of the statements in the
declaration and the mere filing does not extend parental rights
to the claimant.

The filing entitles the putative father only to

notice and an opportunity to appear in court proceedings
affecting the child.
Notice is also required in Wisconsin to a putative
father who has not filed a declaration but who has been adjudged
the father in a court proceeding or one "who may be the. natural
father • • • and is living in a familial relationship with the
child", Wis. Stat. Ann. Sec. 48.195 (West. Supp. 1976).

Finally,

the right to notice of a proceeding to terminate parental rights
is given to a person "alleged to the court to be the natural
father", Wis. Stat. Ann. Sec. 48.42(3) (West. Supp. 1976).

To

this end, the court "shall make inquiry of the mother as to the
identity of the natural father", ibid, Sec. 48.42(3). ·Wisconsin
thus limits its notice to fathers who have been identified
formally or informally, or who have come forward in some way.
Utah's statute most closely resembles that of Michigan
which provided:

"Release for purposes of adoption given only by

a mother of a child born out of wedlock is sufficient and rights
of any putati,re father shall not be recognized thereafter in any
court unless the person claiming to be the father of the child
has filed with the probate court prior to the birth of the child,
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a notice of intent to claim paternity" Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. Sec.
710.31 et seq. (Supp. 1972) which has since been repealed and a
much more complex scheme inaugurated, Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. Sec
710.31 et. seq. (Supp. 1976).

The present Michigan statute makes

no provision for any but personal service, it contains specific
guidelines and limitations on the rights of the recognized
natural father to obtain custody and it emphasizes early
procedures encouraging the father to claim or disclaim interest
before the child's birth.

Michigan allows the father to take the

initiative by providing that "a person claiming under oath to be
the father of the child" may file a notice of intent to claim
paternity before the child's birth.

Such filing entitles the

presumed father to receive notice of the hearing at which
parental rights are to be determined or terminated.

The unwed

mother may also initiate notice and is encouraged to do so.

The

notice of intent to release her consent is to be served on the
named putative father personally by any officer or person
authorized to serve process of the court and advises the putative
father of his right to file a notice of intent to claim paternity
and informs him that failure to so file before the birth or
expected confinement whichever is later will constitute a waiver
of further notice, a denial of interest, and a termination of all
rights to the child.

Following the birth of the child, the court

holds a hearing as soon as practical to determine the father's
identity and to determine his rights.

Notice of the hearing must

be given to 1) those who filed an intent to claim paternity, 2)
those who were not served with the Notice of Intent to Release or
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Consent at least thirty days before the anticipated birth and, 3)
those who were not served at all but who the court has reason to
believe may be the father of the childe
father is not required at
se~ved

all~

Notice to an unknown

If a known father was properly

with a Notice of Intent to Release or Consent or received

(or waived) notice of the hearinq, the court may terminate his
rights if he has 1) failed to file an intent to claim paternity
within the specified time, 2) disclaimed paternity, or 3) failed
to appear at the hearing.

If the formally adjudged father is

present at the hearing, has not lost or waived his rights and
seeks custody, the statutes set out a procedure attempting to
discriminate between fathers who have not established a
relationship with the child and those who have.

In the first

category is the man who has "not established any custodial
relationship" with the child, or who has not supported the
pregnant mother and/or child.

In such a situation the court must

investigate the father's ability to care for the child and will
award custody only if it is found to be in the child's "best
interest".

In the second category are fathers who have

established a custodial relationship or who have supported the
mother or child for at least ninety (90} days before receiving
notice of the hearing.

The rights of these fathers are not

subject to the "best interests" rule, but may be terminated only
on traditional grounds of parental unfitness, abandonment, etc.
Michigan law originally required notice only to fathers who have
filed a Notice of Intent in Probate Court, or were living with
the mother as husband and wife, while under present law, a father
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who has taken informal steps to make k:nown his paternity such as
having his name entered on the birth certificate, informally
acknowledging the child, taking insurance for the child, etc., is
given notice and the right to appear and establish his parental
rights.

The Michigan statute as well as that of Utah

a~tempts

to

avoid the practical difficulties presented when the identity of
the father is unknown.
registration system.

Both schemes involve a paternal
In effect, the statutes reverse the notice

burden and although a registered father will receive notice of a
pending proceeding, he bears the initial responsibility of
officially asserting his intentions.
Such registration laws aim to accomplish several
objectives.

First, they obviate the need for time consuming

efforts to locate the father after the birth of the child.

Both

speed and preservation of the mother's anonymity are thereby
served.

Second, they seek to thwart the mother's efforts to

defeat a father's interest by withholding his name from the
adoption agency.

Registration assures the father of notice.

Third, by imposing a duty of action on the father, the statute
operates to sever the interests of those who fail even to make
themselves aware of the mother's pregnancy.
The impending b{rth of an illegitimate child carries
the potential for warning the putative father of the possibility
of forthcoming proceedings which will affect his rights.

As the

child's procreator, the putative father bears responsibility for
his offspring's well-being.

It should be clear to him. that this

responsiblity must be assumed, and that his failure to do so will
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result in the State's assuming responsibility for the childe
Given this opportunity for knowledge, it is reasonable to permit
self-information as the unknown putative father's sole means of
notice.
The U.S. Supreme Court has distinquished Stanley in
Quilloin v. Wallcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978).

In that case, the

Court made it clear that a state has the right in custody cases
involving illegitimate children to distinguish between parents of
legitimate and parents of illegitimate children.

The court noted

that in the Stanley case the issue involved was between a State
and the illegitimate father of a child to whom he had acted as a
father for quite a number of years, who had the greater interest
over the child absent any type of hearing on the question of
fitness.

In Quilloin, however, the Court was faced only with the

question of approving an adoption which would "give full
recognition to a family unit already in existence, a result
desired by all concerned, except appellant".

The Court stated

"we think appellant's (the natural father's) interests are
readily distinguishable from those of a separated or divorced
father, and accordingly believe that the state could permissibly
give appellant less veto authority than it provides to a married
father", 434 U.S. at 256.

In the Quilloin case the law which was

being challenged provided that if the child was illegitimate the
mother was the only recognized parent and was given exclusive
authority to exercise all parental prerogatives.

The court

upheld that law which is substantially less protective of the
rights of 'the father of an illegitimate child than is Utah Code
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Annotated 78-30-4(3).

There was, therefore, in Quilloin no

denial of equal protection, the putative father having had no
actual or legal custody and, therefore, having never shouldered
any significant responsibility with respect to the daily
supervision, education, protection or care of the child, 434 U.S.
at 256.
A review of the history of the U.C.A 78-30-4(3)
discloses that the House Bill was intended to cure the problems
presented by the Supreme Court ruling in Stanley v. Illinois.

It

was noted that often a father would be unknown, could not be
found, or would not come forward and the purpose of the bill was
to protect the rights of natural fathers, at the same time
requiring the natural father to come foward by filing a Notice of
Claim of Paternity with the Department of Vital Statistics.

(See

record of House of Representatives, introduction of bill by its
Sponsor.)

The Utah Senate amended 78-30-4 by adding subparagraph

(3)(c) as follows:
"Any father of such child who fails to file
and register his Notice of Claim to Paternity
and his agreement to support the child shall
be barred from thereafter bringing or
maintaining any action to establish his
paternity of the child. Such failure shall
further constitute an abandonment of said
child and a waiver and surrender of any right
to notice of or to a hearing in any judicial
proceeding for the adoption of said child and
the consent of such father to the adootion of
such child shall not be required."
~
Such language clearly reveals the intent of the
Legislature to place the burden of self-inquiry notice on the
putative father and evidences the further intent that placements
be speedy, obviating the "state of limbo" in which a child is
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placed upon birth where the natural mother consents to its
release but the natural father has failed to come forward as
required by the registration system.
As permitted by the statute, Mr. Ellis could have taken
steps prior to the birth of the child to register within the
State of Utah and failed to do so.

He delayed doing so until

eighteen days after the birth of the child and fourteen days
after the mother relinquished the child to defendant agency.

The

statutory scheme places the burden on plaintiff to keep himself
informed of the mother's intentions and whereabouts.
To set aside the registration scheme as a denial of due
process creates uncertainty in the many adoptions that have been
taken in reliance on that scheme.
The trial court in its summation stated the following
commencing at page 61 of the record:
The statute says that failure to file the
acknowledgment constitutes an abandonment of
the child and a waiver and surrender of any
right to notice.
I just finished my responsibilities on
the division handling adoptions during the
last six months and each time I conducted an
adoption hearing involving the adoption of a
child born out of wedlock, the Certificate of
Search was required to be filed and was filed
in which it was certified that the
examination of the records of the state
agency showed that no acknowledgment of
paternity had been filed. An~ I made that
finding in my rulings and recited the fact
that that constituted, under our statute, an
abandonment of the child by the natural
father so that no further notice need be
given to him and we coul~ procee~ with the
adoption without any notice to him.
I think it is important that we have some
sort of statutory authority for bringing this
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sort of a thing to a quick head, that we
cannot in our society put children out for
adoption, let them be adopted, give them a
decree of adoption, only to have the person
claiming to be the natural father come in and
say 'I never gave my consent and therefore
the adoption is not valid and I want my day
in court'*** It seems to me that there are
two sides to this coin as there usually is to
most questions. One is that the mother-, the
natural mother, who decides to give her child
up for adoption arranges with a ~hild
placement agency to place the child and does
so and they take the child and they place it
out for adoption; and we protect her identity
from the adopting parents and we protect
their identity from other people. So that
they don't know, in the natural course of
events, and of course, there are exceptions,
who the natural parents are or who the
adoptive parents are. And it seems to me
that the very birth of the child whose
mother, because of her circumstances, wants
to give up the child for adoption rather than
assume the responsibility of raising the
child, has some rights to have that decided
rather quickly and taken care of rather
quickly.
And so I think while your case, it may be
a hardship because of the particular facts of
the case, I don't think that that is grounds
for ruling that this statute is
unconstitutional.
I think this court is
bound by the mandatory language of the
statute that says 'must be registered'. And
I think that the facts of the case, or
whether it comes to me in the pleadings, or
failure to so allege, or by affidavit, aren't
crucial where I think it is evident from the
facts presented here that the acknowledgment
of paternity was not in fact filed by the man
claiming to be the natural father within the
time required by the statute.
I think it is
probably as good a case as we will ever get
here for letting the Supreme Court pass upon
that question. But having lived with that
statute for several years and I think this
particular section was added in 1975, seeing
it work and the advantages of the very
language of the statute in enabling us to
proceed with adoption matters in the absence
of the consent of the natural father, I would
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be reluctant to rule it unconstitutional
because I don't think it is."
In re Adoption of Lathrop, 575 P .. 2d 894 {Kan. 1978),
the Kansas Supreme Court stated that due process and equal
protection do not require that the consent of a putative father
be obtained before his child is adopted.

The court reasoned that

if a putative father chooses not to appear and make known his
desires to care for the child, his rights are de minimus and may
be terminated without his consent by finalizing the adoption.
The court further stated that the minimal right must be weighed
against "a strong state interest in placing children in a stable
nurturing family atmosphere".
that

The Lathrop case, therefore, holds

due process and equal protection· require notice to a

putative father of a pending adoption only where he has "appeared
and asserted his desire to care for his child".

The decision

discusses notice to a father whose identity and whereabouts are
unknown by "constructive notice" given in a form reasonably
calculated to actually inform him of the adoption while at the
same time duly protecting the privacy rights of the mother.
Kansas had not adopted a registration system similar to that of
Utah and the constitutionality of such a registration system was
not at issue ..
The case of Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 60 L. Ed.
2d. 297, 99 S. Ct.

{1979) is cited by Appellant as

determining that equal protection demands that an unwed father
can veto the adoption of his child the same as unwed mothers.
The unwe<i, natural father of two children challenged the
constitutionality of the New York statute after petition was
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granted allowing the natural mother and her second husband to
adopt the children.

The natural father had resided with the

mother and had contributed to the childrens' support for a number
of years, appeared as the father on their birth certificates, and
maintained consistent contact with the children after separating
from the mother.

While the Supreme Court of the United States

held that under such circumstances the permitting of unwed
mothers, but not unwed fathers, to veto the adoption of a child
by withholding consent violated the Equal Protection Clause Caban
is distinguishable from the instant case on its facts.

Appellant

furnished no support or custodial care and had no contact with
the child, nor had he lived with the mother.

The Court at pg.

307 stated, "In those cases where the father never has come
forward to participate in the rearing of his child nothing in the
Equal Protection Clause precludes the State from withholding from
him the privilege of vetoing the adoption of that child."
The writer is impressed with the following reasoning of
Mr. Justice Stevens with whom the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice
Rehnquist joined in a dissenting opinion.

At page 321 of U.S.

Supreme Court Reports appears the following:
"Because I consider the course on
Court is currently embarked to be
most serious, I shall explain why
its holding in this case as quite

which the
potentially
I regard
narrow.

The adoption decrees that have been
entered without the consent of the natural
father must number in the millions. An
untold number of family and financial
decisions have been made in reliance on the
validity of those decrees. Because the Court
has crossed a new constitutional frontier
with today's decision, those reliance
interests unquestionably foreclose
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retroactive application of this ruling
(citing Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S.
97, 106-107, 30 L. Ed. 2d 296, 92 Se Ct.
349)e
Families that include adopted children
need have no concern about the probable
impact of this case on their familial
security.
Nor is there any reason why the decision
should affect the processing of most future
adoptions. The fact that an unusual
application of a state statute has been held
unconstitutional on equal protection grounds
does not necessarily eliminate the entire
statute as a basis for future legitimate
action. The procedure to be followed in
cases involving infants who are in the
custody of their mothers whether solely or
jointly with the father--or of agencies with
authority to consent to adoption, is entirely
unaffected by the courts holding or by its
reasoning. In fact, as I read the Court's
opinion, the statutes now in effect may be
enforced as usual unless 'the adoption of
older children is sought' ante at
60 L. Ed. 2d 307 and 'the
~f-a~t~h-e_r__,,h_a_s~e~stablished a substantial
relationship with the child and is willing to
admit his paternity' id. at
60
L. Ed. 2d 308. State legislatures will no
doubt promptly revise their adoption laws to
comply with the rule of this case, but as
long as state courts are prepared to construe
their existing statutes to contain a
requirement of paternal consent 'in cases
such as this' ibid, I see no reason why they
mav not continue to enter valid adoption
decrees in the countless routine cases that
will arise before statutes can be amended.
In short, this is an exceptional case
that should have no effect on the typical
adoption proceeding. Indeed, I suspect that
it will affect only a tiny fraction of the
cases covered by the statutes that must now
be rewritten. Accordingly, although my
disagreement with the Court is as profound as
that fraction is small, I am confident that
the wisdom of judges will forestall any wide
spread harm."
One gathers from reading both the majority and
dissenting opinions in Caban (which is the latest U.S. Supreme
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court pronouncement relative to the right of an unwed father to
block adoption of his child by withholding consent) that both
Stanley and Caban should be read in. the light of their own
peculiar facts.
This court has stated that an unwed mother possesses a
superior right to custody and control to an unwed father.
In re Baby Girl M, 25 Ut. 2d 101, 476 P.2d 1013 (1970}.

It is in

the public interest to impose upon one of the parties a legal
responsibility for the welfare of the child.

Since the female is

present at the birth of the child and identifiable as the mother,
the state should select the unwed mother rather than the unwed
father as the parent with legal responsibility.
treatment under the law, is not unreasonable.

Thus, unequal

·Further,

administrative convenience justifies the use of unequal
treatment.

The child's welfare is of prime consideration and has

been recognized by the courts.

The removal of children from

adoptive homes following placement may be harmful, and, if
accomplished frequently enough, will deter qualified and
deserving prospective parents from applying for an adoptive
child.

The courts are also aware that the uncertainty as to its

status is not only harmful to the child but also frustrates and
makes more difficult the work of the adoption agencies,"

(quoted

from In re Brennan, 270 Minn. 455, 462, 134 N.W. 2d 126, 131
(1968)).

Prompt placement serves both the child's need for early

parental care and minimizes detrimental psychological effects.
The unwed mother's interests are also of great
importance.

She should be shielded from external pressures which
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force her to relive her experience.

Notice requirements or

hearings are often more harsh on her than on the putative father
and making her situation public is equivalent to attaching a
stigma to her in the eyes of the public and her rights to privacy
are in jeopardy.
All of the above reasons would argue for a registration
scheme such as our legislature has enacted which puts the notice
burden of self-inquiry on the putative father and provides a
speedy and final determination of his rights in the event of a
failure to comply with the registration statute.
II.

THE NOTICE OF CLAIM OF PATERNITY

WAS NOT TIMELY FILED.

The Utah registration statute requires that the
putative father must register prior to the date the illegitimate
child is relinquished or placed with an agency licensed to
provide adoption services or prior to the filing of a Petition by
a person with whom the mother has placed the child for adoption.
That language does not give the putative father an option, but
rather, requires him to act by a certain event recognizing two
kinds of adoptions; that is, agency placements and private
placements.

It is apparent that the intent of the legislature

was to terminate the rights of the putative father upon his
failure to register prior to the placement of ·the child with a
licensed agency for the obvious reason that to leave uncertain
the rights of said putative father following the relinquishment
to the agency places the agency in a most difficult position, to
wit~

having to place the child with prospective adoptive parents

with the question of the putative father's rights still
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undetermined or, in the alternative, providing care for the child
at its own expense until the putative father's rights are
extinguished by a hearing.

If, on the other hand, no agency is

involved and the placement is a private one, the Petition for
Adoption is, as a matter of practice., filed at approximately the
time that the child is placed with the proposed adoptive parents
and constitutes the basis for the award·of temporary custody of
the child to such par en ts pending the child's residing in_ their
home the requisite six month period for adoption.

In both cases,

the language of the statute cuts off the rights of the putative
father prior to the child's being placed in the home of the
prospective adoptive parents which, it is submitted, is in the
best interests of the child and subserves public policy.
Plaintiff-Appellant in the instant case failed to file
his Notice prior to the relinquishment to a licensed agency.

The

alternative provision of the statute with respect to filing
"prior to the filing of a Petition by a person with whom
the mbther has placed the child for adoption". is not operative in
the instant case.
Plaintiff-Appellant argues that the language of 78-304 ( 3) ( b) if interpreted in the manner followed by the trial court
in thii case creates a total absurdity w~en read in connection
with subsection (d) since the latter section requires the filing
of a Certificate of Search of the records of the Bureau of Vital
Statistics signed by its director stating that "a diligent search
has been made of the registry of no.tices from fathers of
illegitimate children and that no registration has been found
pertaining to the father of the illegitimate child in question".
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It is submitted that there is no conflict in the
subsections when the two are read in conjunction with subsection
3(c) which provides that "such failure (to file the notice within
the_ requisite time) shall further constitute an abandonment of
said child and a waiver and surrender of any right to notice of
or to a hearing in any judicial proceeding for the adoption of
said child and the consent of such father to the adoption of such
child shall not be required".

It is not the filing of the Notice

of Claim to Paternity that determines the right of the putative
father to further notice of the proceeding, but the timely filing
of such notice.

Were this not so, the entire statutory scheme

would be frustrated.
III. PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAS NOT
LEGITIMATED AND ADOPTED THE CHILD
BY PUBLICALLY ACKNOWLEDGING IT AS HIS.
Title 78-30-12

u.c.A.

1953 as amended provides:

"The father of an illegitimate child by
publically acknowleding it as his own,
receiving it as such with the consent of his
wife, if he is married, into his family, and
otherwise treating it as if it were a
legitimate child, thereby adopts it as such
and such child is thereupon deemed for all
purposes legitimate from the time of its
birth. The foregoing provisions of this
chapter do not apply to such an adoption."
Plaintiff-Appellant argues that by advising L.D.S.
Social Services that he was the father of the child, by filing
his Notice of Claim of Paternity with the Bureau of Vital
Statistics, and by filing his verified Complaint in which he
expresses his desire to brin~ the child into his parents' home
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and care for it, he has legitimated and adopted the child.

The

statute does not by its terms purport to deal with the situation,
as here, where the natural mother relinquishes the child to a
placement agency for adoption.

Obviously, under such

circumstances, the putative father cannot "receive it as such
(his own) with the consent of his wife, if he is married, into
his family" nor can he "otherwise treat it as if it were a
legitimate child."

In a footnote in In re Baby Girl M. supra at

page 1015, it is noted that Section 230 of the Civil Code of
California is identical to 78-30-12 U.C.A. 1953.

The case of

Darwin v. Ganger, 174 Cal. App. 2d 63, 344 Pac. 2d 353 (1959) is
cited wherein at page 358 the court stated:
"Where a man has no wife, he can publically
acknowledge his child notwithstanding the
fact that he does not maintain a household
into which the child is taken. If the man is
unmarried, the 'family' referred to in
Section 230 may consist only of the father,
mother, and child. Thus, an unmarried man
may legitimize his offspring by living with
the mother and child for a short period
during which he represented the mother as his
wife and the child as his own ***"
It is obvious that this court in In re Baby Girl M did
not intend to approve the legitimizing and adopting of a child
merely by a putative father acknowledging it as his own without
the "receiving it into his family" which family includes the
father, a mother and the child.

In that case the putative father

had married the child's mother in 1958 and divorced in 1963 and
they had intended to remarry but the mother had been so upset by
the loss of the child that the impending marriage had been
postponed.

During the mother's pregnancy the putative father and
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natural mother had resided together.
case from the instant onee

Such facts distinguish that

The use of the word "family" in the

statute would indicate that the putative father have a wife or,
in the alternative, that he create a "family" by at least 1 iv ing
with the natural mother$

The intent of the statute could hardly

be stretched so far as to contend that the "family" referred to
was the "family" consisting of the putative father and his
parents.

CONCLUSION
Utah enacted a registration system for putative fathers
to meet the possible implications of Stanley v. Illinois decided
in 1972, which system meets the constitutional test in that the
notice to the putative father is one of self-inquiry and places
the burden upon him to come forward and to comply prior to the
relinquishment of the child by the natural mother to a licensed
placement agency.

The sound public policy reasons for placing

the burden on the putative father include the desirability of
protecting the anonymity of the natural mother, the desirability
of an immediate placement with the proposed adoptive parents, the
certainty in adoptions where a Certificate of Search indicates no
claim of paternity having been filed prior to the relinquishment
of the child to a licensed placement agency, and the practical
economic benefits of having the proposed adoptive parents assume
the responsibility for the child immediately upon its release
from the hospital.

The registration system is' effective and

lends certainty to the adoption process which is necessary if
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prospective adoptive parents are not to be deterred from taking a
child born of an unwed mother into their home.

The putative

father has failed to timely file his claim of paternity in this
case nor has he complied with the statutory requisites which
would have legitimated and adopted the child as his own.

The

Order of Dismissal with Prejudice of Plaintiff's Amended
Complaint for Writ of Habeas Corpus should be affirmed.
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